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This article mounts a defense of economic democracy that piggybacks on argu-
ments for workplace democracy. It is addressed to those republicans and egalitar-
ians who are committed to workplace democracy. The article argues that those 
workplace democrats should, first, be opposed to private property, and, second, 
be committed to economic democracy, or—what amounts to the same thing—so-
cialism. Workplace democracy is the idea that workers ought to possess control 
rights over the conditions of production in their places of work. Socialism is the 
idea that workers and citizens ought to possess control rights over the conditions 
of production in the economy as a whole. To be clear: I am not claiming that all 
republicans or democrats are socialists. All I am claiming is that republicans, 
democrats, and co-travelers who affirm workplace democracy thereby commit 
themselves to socialism. Those workplace democrats cannot disembark the dem-
ocratic train at workplace democracy; they must ride it to the very end, and that 
end is socialism. Call this the piggyback argument .
The piggyback argument proceeds as follows. I begin by identifying the 
fundamental pro tanto  normative principles that ground the main contemporary 
arguments for workplace democracy: republican (Section 1) and political- 
egalitarian (Section 2).1  I then argue for two theses. First, that the full realization 
of these principles is undermined by the existence of private property in the means 
of production. This is the anti-property thesis . Second, that avowal of work-
place democracy on the basis of these principles commits those who avow them 
to economic democracy. This is the socialism thesis  (Sections 3 and 5). I then 
rebut two influential objections to the piggyback argument. The first draws on an 
argument due to David Ellerman and Carole Pateman (Section 4) and the second 
on a time-honored Keynesian stratagem in favor of private investment (Section 6). 
I conclude by considering some institutional implications, including the old model 
of worker control based on workers’ councils (Section 7).
1. Republican Arguments for Workplace Democracy
Consider, first, the republican justification for workplace democracy. 
Republicans object to the existence of arbitrary, uncontrolled, or unchecked 
power, on grounds of domination. Philip Pettit (1997), for example, defines domi-
nation as subjection to arbitrary power, where arbitrariness is defined as failure 
to promote or track the interests of those subject to power. The republican defini-
tion of “interest” is a topic of considerable controversy (see, e.g., Lovett 2010). 
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More recently, Pettit (2012) has suggested that interests may be deliberatively 
constituted, such that the possession of arbitrary power implies failure, by the 
powerful, to track interests that survive some process of democratic delibera-
tion. Domination, in this sense, entails the absence of democratic authorization. 
It follows that democratically authorized power is not arbitrary, uncontrolled, or 
unchecked, and therefore does not constitute domination.
Starting from this set of claims about domination, republicans have argued 
that the legitimation of hierarchical relations—bosses’ power over workers—
requires workplace democracy. Keith Breen (2015) and Iñigo Gonzalez-Ricoy 
(2014), for example, emphasize the arbitrary power of bosses, noting that bossing 
power does not bother republicans “as long as it is adequately checked, that is, as 
long as the employer is forced to track the interests of the employee” (Gonzalez-
Ricoy 2014, 238). Along similar lines, Alex Gourevitch (2016) highlights the im-
portance of the right to strike as a counterweight to bossing power. The exercise of 
such power, he suggests, regularly includes forcing workers to work without pay; 
firing them for Facebook comments or sexual orientation; forcing them to wear 
diapers; denying them lunch breaks and air conditioning; making them take drug 
tests, alter religious practices, disown their political commitments, and so on.2 
These republican arguments against bossing power do not uniquely favor 
workplace democracy; some republicans believe that bossing power can be ad-
equately checked without worker control over the workplace. Workplace con-
stitutionalists, for example, maintain that an adequate remedy to workplace 
domination implements and enforces stringent pro-labor labor legislation, includ-
ing pro-union and strike-friendly laws (Hsieh 2005; Dagger 2006; Breen 2015). 
In response to Pettit/Gourevitch-type complaints, the workplace constitutionalist 
insists on comprehensive enforcement of such laws. The workplace constitution-
alist infers that workplace democracy is not the sole remedy for workplace dom-
ination and that none of the interferences enumerated in the previous paragraph 
count uniquely in favor of workplace democracy.
The republican workplace democrat has two rebuttals to the workplace con-
stitutionalist. The first goes as follows: exclusively legal remedies to workplace 
domination, however well-designed, are both infeasible and undesirable. They 
are infeasible because not every possible contingency of the employer–employee 
relation can be written into a contract. And even if it could, such minute spec-
ification would deprive both parties of dealing appositely with contingencies. 
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1990; 1992) generalize this argument. They 
suggest that labor markets are characterized by what they call “contested ex-
change,” that is, exchange in which one agent possesses power over another in 
virtue of incomplete markets or contracts. According to Bowles and Gintis, all 
contested exchange is subject to “endogenous enforcement”; that is, contested 
exchange engenders a principal–agent relationship3  such that parties external to 
the contract—courts, for example—cannot fully enforce its terms. Bowles and 
Gintis maintain, further, that contested exchange pervades labor markets. This 
is the main contrast between their account and Walrasian economic models, in 
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which all enforcement is exogenous, that is, implemented by parties external to 
the contract:
While the employer’s promise to pay the wage is legally enforceable, the worker’s prom-
ise to bestow an adequate level of effort and care upon the tasks assigned, even if offered, 
is not. At the level of effort expected by management, work is subjectively costly for the 
worker to provide, valuable to the employer, and costly to measure. The manager–worker 
relationship thus is contested exchange. (Bowles and Gintis 1992, 333)
It follows that the anti-domination ameliorative ambitions of workplace constitu-
tionalism are severely circumscribed. Contested exchange engenders power re-
lations, even in the presence of powerful unions and strike-friendly laws. These 
relations, in turn, arise “from wealth-holders’ structural location in nonclearing 
markets,4  which allows them to use sanctions to elicit managerial compliance 
with the objectives of profit maximization, or through their analogous use of 
sanctions to control workers directly” (Bowles and Gintis 1992, 330). If A is the 
employer, and B the employee, then
in equilibrium there will exist unemployed workers identical to B who would prefer to 
be employed. Thus A’s threat to dismiss B is credible and dismissal is costly to B. Hence 
A can apply sanctions to B.… Thus A has power over B. (Bowles and Gintis 1992, 338)
Bowles and Gintis infer that unemployment is both necessary and sufficient for 
workplace domination; it is, as they put it, a “worker disciplining device.” If 
Bowles and Gintis are right, then workplace constitutionalism does not suffice to 
abolish workplace domination; a further remedy, such as workplace democracy, 
is necessary.
The second republican argument for workplace democracy—and against 
workplace constitutionalism—does not turn on the existence of unemployment. 
According to that argument, the costs of leaving a job, or abandoning work al-
together, are nearly always considerable. So even under full employment, bosses 
will retain considerable power over workers. It follows that any right to contest 
managerial decisions, short of worker control, is unlikely to be effective or robust 
in the republican sense (Gonzalez-Ricoy 2014, 239–41). Worker control over the 
workplace attenuates this domination by giving workers control rights over their 
conditions of production. These are the main republican arguments for workplace 
democracy. I turn now to political-egalitarian arguments.
2. Political-Egalitarian Arguments for Workplace Democracy
Political-egalitarianism is a subset of relational egalitarianism.5  Relational 
egalitarianism’s central normative commitment pertains to egalitarian social re-
lationships (as opposed to merely egalitarian distributions : see Anderson 1999). 
In recent democratic theory, a necessary condition for relating as equals, in the 
relevant sense, is provided by the right to an equal say (Christiano 2008), or 
by an equal opportunity to influence decision making (Kolodny 2014; Viehoff 
262  Nicholas Vrousalis
2014). Like the republicans discussed above, relational egalitarians believe that 
the possession of a power over others is not objectionable as such . Unlike those 
republicans, relational egalitarians do not emphasize arbitrary, uncontrolled, or 
unchecked power. For them, the possession of a power over others is objection-
able if and only if it fails to reflect a right to an equal say, or an equal opportunity 
to influence outcomes on the part of those subject to that power. The normative 
emphasis, therefore, is not on power per se , but rather on the egalitarian constitu-
tion of decision-making processes.
Political-egalitarians limit the purview of these processes to the relationship 
between citizen and state. They note that ownership-conferred power sometimes 
jeopardizes political equality. According to Thomas Christiano, for example, 
egalitarian social relationships require “equality in the process of deliberation as 
well as equality in the resources that go into making coalitions and bargaining 
over political aims and policies” (Christiano 2010, 199). But then capitalist pri-
vate property will, in some cases, undermine the right to an equal say. For it will 
sometimes be the case that
Capitalist firms … act in ways that undermine the pursuit of democratically chosen 
aims.… They do this by laying off workers in response to minimum wage increases or 
disinvesting in the case of pollution laws. Or they have an influence merely because they 
are expected to do these things once the policies are in place. Here the capitalists are … 
determining the conditions of feasibility for the pursuit of aims and thereby determining 
the extent to which aims are achieved. Hence the capitalists limit the achievement of the 
chosen aims of the citizens and they do this simply by virtue of being able to exercise 
their ordinary liberal property rights. (Christiano 2010, 206)
This is a variant of Adam Przeworski’s (1985) structural dependence thesis . 
The idea is that unrestricted exercise of “liberal property rights” undermines the 
principle that “citizens be able to choose as equals what aims the society is to 
realize”; capitalists thereby appropriate “a special exercise of political power for 
themselves” (Christiano 2010, 203).6  Capitalist power is objectionable when and 
because it undermines political equality.
The political-egalitarian advocate of workplace democracy now needs an 
auxiliary premise, explaining why the democratic workplace is less likely to 
abridge the equal-say principle than the capitalist workplace. This premise is pro-
vided by the political economy of cooperatives. The idea is that worker-controlled 
cooperatives are unlikely to engage in lockouts or to fire members in response to, 
say, statutory increases in the minimum wage (see Dow 2003 for a survey of the 
relevant literature). Crucially, cooperatives cannot credibly threaten to relocate 
in the event of a tax hike, at least not without the joint relocation of their as-
sets and members. Hence, worker-controlled cooperatives cannot credibly prof-
fer the threats that capitalist firms regularly do proffer. In this sense, they have 
less power over governments and are significantly less likely to run afoul of the 
equal-say requirement. This, in rough outline, is the political-egalitarian case for 
workplace democracy.
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I now define the anti-property and socialism theses. The anti-property thesis 
holds that capitalist private property undermines the full realization of the princi-
ples grounding adherence to workplace democracy—respectively, republican and 
political-egalitarian. A note of caution: by “private property” I mean only private 
property in the means of production, that is, in means used to produce all-purpose 
means. The anti-property thesis does not, therefore, censure the power to appro-
priate resources and goods, as such. It only censures the wherewithal to subor-
dinate others7  by means of such appropriations. The socialism thesis holds that 
the full realization of republican and political-egalitarian principles engenders, 
in addition, a pro tanto  commitment to economic democracy.8  Workplace demo-
crats must, I think, embrace the democratic socialization of productive resources 
(I discuss the institutional form of that socialization in Section 7). I begin with the 
republican argument for these two theses.
3. Republicans against Property
Suppose bosses possess unchecked power over workers. Workplace democ-
racy, republican workplace democrats (hereafter republicans) maintain, is both 
necessary and sufficient to force bosses to track the interests of workers. This 
attenuates unchecked power. What exactly confers that power on bosses? The 
standard economist’s answer is: exclusive control over some scarce asset (physi-
cal capital, ideas, knowledge, and so on). But then such control confers power 
on economic agents other than bosses: banks, for example, may possess power 
over indebted cooperatives. Crucially, this power is arbitrary, uncontrolled, or un-
checked, unless it is subject to democratic authorization. In other words, if private 
owners of productive assets can dominate workers in hiring relationships, then 
they can dominate workers outside such relationships. It is private property, and 
not just the employment relationship, that enables workplace domination.
Republicans object to this assimilation of the employment relationship under 
private property. Elizabeth Anderson, for example, has criticized liberal and 
libertarian political philosophers for subsuming the labor contract under “mar-
ket”—as opposed to “governance”—relations. She writes:
This frame falsely assimilates the employee to an independent contractor, and thereby 
effaces the power relations entailed by employment. Independent contractors own their 
own tools, set their own hours of work, work for a variety of clients of their own choosing, 
and decide how to do their jobs without direction from their clients. This is not a gover-
nance relation. When employees accept a job, they leave the market and enter a hierarchy 
within the firm, subordinate to their boss. This is a governance relation. (Anderson 2015, 
59–60)
Anderson takes Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) to task for suggest-
ing that firm governance does not involve “relations of authority” (Anderson 
2015, 61, n. 29); she defends the view that firm relations do constitute relations 
of authority. It follows, according to Anderson, that market relations—exchange 
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relations between “independent contractors”—do not come under the purview of 
republican democratization demands. On this view, only intra -firm capitalist acts 
between consenting adults are candidates for domination.
Anderson is right that the employment relation is not assimilable to a prop-
erty relation; the workplace is  special. But her argument is incomplete; she offers 
no principled reasons for thinking that mere property relations, as such, fail to 
subject B to the “arbitrary, unaccountable will of [A]—who can act without hav-
ing to ask anyone else’s permission” (Anderson 2015, 52). A lot hinges on the 
meaning of the terms “having” and “permission.” Consider one way of putting 
pressure on these terms.
Lazy Colonialist has colonized Friday’s territory. Unlike other colonialists, 
who would appropriate Friday’s land and convert Friday into a wage laborer, Lazy 
Colonialist appropriates Friday’s land and rents it out to Friday at extortionate 
rates. There is, by republican lights, domination here. If this is not an instance of 
domination, then the republican schema is ethically irrelevant, or worse. There 
is, however, no vertical governance or authority relation here: Lazy Colonialist’s 
power is exclusively market-mediated. Call this form of domination horizontal , 
to distinguish it from the vertical domination of the capitalist workplace. The 
rest of this section argues that horizontal domination pervades capitalist property 
relations, by republican lights.
3.1. The Trade Case
I begin by providing a general argument for the view that domination can 
obtain through nonhierarchical market exchanges between private commodity 
owners.9  I then apply that argument to relations between democratic workers’ 
cooperatives.
Consider an abandoned island, on which there are two producers, Friday and 
Robinson. They are qualitatively identical in their talents, skill, intelligence, and 
concern for efficiency and the common good. The only difference is that Robinson 
owns capital, whereas Friday does not. If they do not trade, Robinson will work 
eight hours per day and Friday will work sixteen, each producing goods to satisfy 
their basic needs. If they do trade, however, Friday will only work twelve hours 
per day and Robinson four. The total net saving in hours worked is due to special-
ization, given the comparative advantages of each agent.
John Roemer has cogently argued that the trade case involves exploitation. 
His argument goes as follows. Trade enables Robinson to extract a surplus from 
Friday. Having worked for four hours, Robinson can sleep for the rest of the day, 
while Friday toils to produce what Robinson would otherwise have produced 
only with an extra four hours of work. To be sure, trade saves both Friday and 
Robinson four hours of work each. However, Friday must optimize by unilater-
ally serving Robinson for four hours just because Robinson owns more capital. 
Hence,
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Robinson benefits from Friday’s presence, and is able to use his wealth as leverage, 
through the market, to get Friday to work for him, which Friday would not have to do if 
he had access to his per capita share of the produced capital. (Roemer 1996, 52)
I now argue that this form of exploitation, which obtains through mere market 
exchange, entails domination in the republican sense. Domination, on the repub-
lican view, is subjection to arbitrary, uncontrolled, or unchecked power. In the 
trade case, Robinson clearly possesses power over Friday, indeed more power 
than Friday possesses over Robinson (notice Roemer’s claim that Robinson can 
“get Friday to work”). The discrepancy between the number of hours worked 
provides evidence of such power. Robinson’s power is, moreover, arbitrary, in 
the sense that it is neither controlled nor checked by Friday, nor forced to track 
Friday’s interests. In equilibrium—that is, after Friday and Robinson have com-
pleted their optimific trades—Friday acts as Robinson’s unhired servant. So their 
proto-colonial relationship, like any proto-colonial relationship, is one of domi-
nation. It does not follow that republicans are opposed to competitive market rela-
tions per se . It does follow, however, that they are opposed to competitive power 
relations that emerge from an unjust prior distribution , where “unjust” may be 
defined in terms of domination. The provenance of the inequality between Friday 
and Robinson may matter, depending on the republican theory at hand.
If this argument is sound, then it straightforwardly applies to the horizontal 
relationship between privately owned cooperatives. For cooperatives, even the 
most successful ones, will need access to raw materials, machinery, and other 
material conditions of production. Under a system of universal cooperative pro-
duction, in which all firms are worker-owned, the conditions of production can 
only be purchased from other cooperatives. As the process of accumulation pro-
gresses, more successful cooperatives will accumulate wealth at the expense of 
others. This process is objectionable only if market success fails to reflect inno-
vation, effort, and talent—productive efficiency, more generally—as opposed to 
mere wealth inequality, in which case wealth inequality engenders exchanges of 
the Friday–Robinson variety. More precisely: if some market exchange is anal-
ogous to the Friday–Robinson case, in that it betokens subjection to arbitrary, 
uncontrolled, or unchecked power, then it betokens what I called horizontal dom-
ination. I now provide an independent argument for the antecedent of this condi-
tional. I show that universal workplace democracy, however implemented, does 
not preclude workplace domination. If successful, this argument lends support to 
economic democracy on republican grounds.
3.2. The Dictator Case
Suppose Friday Inc. is owned and managed by its workers, who produce 
widgets sold for subsistence. Friday Inc.’s net revenue stream is partly controlled 
by an uncontrolled extra-firm agent, Dictator, who has the power to assign penal-
ties to the sale of the firm’s net output. Dictator says to the members of Friday 
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Inc.: “if you take toilet breaks on Tuesdays, then your revenue stream will suffer a 
penalty.” Fearing the impact of Dictator’s threat on their livelihood, the members 
of Friday Inc. unanimously vote a ban on Tuesday toilet breaks.10  Call this the 
dictator case .
In the dictator case, there are no (unelected) bosses. That is, assuming una-
nimity and an equal distribution of voting power across firm members, there is—
by the republican definitions—no workplace domination by bosses . However, 
Dictator does possess an arbitrary power over the firm’s workers.11  If this con-
clusion is granted, then it follows that workplace domination and workplace de-
mocracy are not mutually exclusive. The dictator case drives a conceptual wedge 
between different sources of workplace domination (intra- versus extra-firm), 
which provides leverage for the argument that follows.
Now suppose there is no Dictator. Instead, there are two self-owned and 
self-managed cooperatives, Robinson Inc. and Friday Inc., pitted against each 
other in competition. Their members do not otherwise differ in talent, skill, in-
telligence, and concern for efficiency and the common good. Robinson Inc. and 
Friday Inc. produce for profit; the former owns a lot of capital, the latter does 
not. It matters how that unequal wealth is acquired: if Robinson Inc. cuts back 
on retained income, or invests in more efficient production techniques, then its 
power over Friday Inc. need not be the fruit of mere wealth inequality. As in the 
dictator case, I am here interested in cases where such justifications of power 
do not obtain: Robinson Inc.’s wealth-conferred power instances domination, by 
republican lights. Suppose all of these assumptions hold. The members of Friday 
Inc. now realize that they cannot successfully compete with Robinson Inc., unless 
they cut back on costs. Suppose, finally, that the only way Friday Inc. can cut back 
on costs consists in banning Tuesday toilet breaks. In light of this, members of 
Friday Inc. vote unanimously to ban Tuesday toilet breaks. Call this the compe-
tition case.
The dictator and competition cases are analogous. Let me explain. Suppose 
it is true that the only way Friday Inc. can remain competitive is to cut back on 
toilet breaks.12  Given the background pattern of incentives, entailed by market 
exigencies, it is as if the members of Robinson Inc. are saying to members of 
Friday Inc.: “if you take toilet breaks on Tuesdays, then your revenue stream will 
suffer a penalty.” But this is exactly what Dictator says in the dictator case! There 
is, therefore, a structural analogy between Dictator’s power in the dictator case 
and Robinson Inc.’s power in the competition case. If the analogy holds, then the 
members of Robinson Inc. dominate the members of Friday Inc. It follows that 
workplace democracy does not suffice to eradicate workplace domination, by the 
republican’s own lights .13 
3.3. Domination and Markets
I now want to bolster the analogy between the dictator and the competition 
case. Note, first, that it is entirely realistic that cutting back on toilet breaks saves 
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firms money—even if cutting back on Tuesday toilet breaks is not. In both cases, 
the firm managers, whether appointed from above or elected from below, retain 
residual authority over workers. That authority helps explain the choice of some 
arbitrary weekday. In other words, I need not deny that the workplace confers 
on some—viz. managers—discretion over others—viz. nonmanager workers. 
However, intra-firm discretion is not the source of domination here. Rather, it is 
the extra -workplace figure of Dictator that wields arbitrary power in the dictator 
case. And if Dictator does wield arbitrary power in that case, then Robinson Inc. 
wields arbitrary power in the competition case.
A putative disanalogy between the two cases seems to be that Dictator, 
unlike Robinson Inc., has complete and unilateral discretion over Friday Inc.’s 
productive outcomes. After all, Robinson Inc. is also constrained by the forces 
of competition; it must buy cheap and sell dear if it is to make a profit. The ap-
pearance of disanalogy is illusory, for Dictator may be constrained to threaten 
toilet-break penalties in a similar way. Suppose that the background structure is 
such that, if Dictator does not proffer the threat, or fails to enforce it in case of 
noncompliance, she gets automatically replaced by Dictator2. If Dictator2 fails to 
enforce the threat, she gets automatically replaced by Dictator3 …. In this case, 
Dictator’s power over Friday Inc. is structurally overdetermined, just as Robinson 
Inc.’s power over Friday Inc. would be, in any competitive scenario.14 
Another putative disanalogy between the dictator and competition cases 
might take issue with agency. That is, Dictator seems to be a conscious unitary 
agent, whereas Robinson Inc. is a corporate entity. And since only conscious 
unitary agents can dominate other agents, Dictator dominates the Friday Inc. 
workers, while Robinson Inc. does not. Now, note that the major premise of this 
argument—that only conscious unitary agents can dominate others—is very 
likely false.15  Crucially, Dictator need not be a unitary conscious agent: she may 
be the resultant of a multitude of decentralized and uncoordinated individual de-
cisions that are merely aggregated in the shape of a corporate agent. Firms are 
corporate agents of exactly that type; Robinson Inc. is merely a token of that type. 
So, if it is granted that Dictator can dominate Friday Inc. as a corporate agent, 
then so can Robinson Inc. The structural analogy between the dictator and the 
competition cases survives.
In the competition case, I conclude, the relation between cooperatives takes 
a dictatorial form, conferring on workers of powerful cooperatives arbitrary 
power over others. In Anderson’s terms, this unjust wealth inequality subjects the 
members of Friday Inc. to the “arbitrary, unaccountable will of [the members of 
Robinson Inc.]—who can act without having to ask anyone else’s permission.”16  It 
follows that workplace democracy does not suffice to remove workplace domina-
tion. Workplace democracy abolishes the pimp, but not the prostitution.17 
Now, my examples do not imply that less efficient firms—like Friday Inc.—
should not be allowed to go under. When power inequalities across firms reflect 
nothing but differences in productive efficiency, there is no domination; Robinson 
Inc. merely helps the allocation of resources conform to efficiency requirements 
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independent of the power relations of one firm over another. So, the question 
whether Robinson Inc. dominates Friday Inc. depends on whether the power of 
the former tracks certain efficiency requirements that obtain independently of 
that power. Under what conditions can we trust markets to meet such require-
ments? The answer depends on complex questions in industrial organization.
Suppose that, in industry L, fixed capital plays a secondary role. Then hier-
archies in L will tend to be relatively horizontal—think of universities, law firms, 
and so on. Competition between firms in L may attenuate inter-firm power dif-
ferentials, while simultaneously reducing intra-firm managerial power. In L, re-
publican values are best served by allowing competition to run its course, within 
limits. Contrast a high-fixed-cost industry K, where hierarchies are relatively ver-
tical—think of factories, technology firms, and so on. Here, state regulation is 
likely to be necessary. High fixed costs in K mean that competition across firms 
will tend to be weaker, such that inter-firm power differentials will be greater. 
Vertical hierarchies will be steeper, such that intra-firm power differentials will 
also be greater. So republican values in K are best served by allowing state and 
worker-managed firms to regulate market and workplace jointly.
Republicans ask under what conditions vertical and horizontal power re-
lations constitute domination. If the provenance of a wealth inequality is not 
domination; if vulnerable members of Friday Inc. have enough and sufficiently 
valuable outside options—there are, say, equally good jobs available; and if the 
availability of such options is not subject to the arbitrary will of capitalists or state 
officials, the members of Friday Inc. are not dominated. But note the stringency 
of these requirements: nondomination seems to require both full employment 
and democratic control over the investment policy undertaken to create it. In 
Section 5 I argue that these conditions are very stringent: they presuppose social-
ized property, or something like it.
I now summarize the argument of this section: if a powerful dictator can 
possess arbitrary, uncontrolled, or unchecked economic power over the members 
of a workers’ cooperative, then so can a creditor, or a powerful market competitor. 
The culprit, in this case, is not the employment relation, but the property relation , 
in conjunction with certain background conditions—namely, the provenance of 
the property relation in domination. It is private property, in other words, that is 
responsible for the domination of the members of Friday Inc. by the members 
of Robinson Inc. In these cases, republican workplace democrats should be op-
posed to private property. This suffices to establish the anti-property thesis. The 
republican argument is naturally moot in cases where firms go under due to bad 
management, a slack workforce, or lack of innovation. As the original Friday–
Robinson example shows, however, not all power inequalities between firms can 
be justified by appeal to such considerations.
It is, now, but a short step to the socialism thesis. If unchecked power requires 
democratic legitimation, then the unchecked power of powerful market agents re-
quires democratic legitimation. I submit that this calls for socialization of (some) 
control rights over the vehicles of that power, the means of production as a whole. 
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It follows that republican workplace democrats should be socialists. This is the 
socialism thesis. I now discuss a republicanism-friendly defense of workplace 
democracy that explicitly denies the anti-property and socialism theses.
4. Ellerman’s Cut
David Ellerman thinks there is no such thing as horizontal domination: all 
capitalist domination is vertical. It is therefore possible to disembark the demo-
cratic train at workplace democracy, well before the terminus of economic de-
mocracy. Ellerman stages this disembarkation attempt by drawing a principled 
distinction between the power of capitalist bosses, on the one hand, and extra-
workplace “capitalists,” such as credit institutions, on the other. He writes,
Capitalism recognizes a universality based on a legal symmetry between persons and 
things; both are rentable. Laborism is not legally symmetrical between persons and 
things. It is based on abolishing the contract for renting human beings, just as the contract 
for lifetime rental, the voluntary self-enslavement contract, is already abolished. Thus, 
laborism exhibits an asymmetrical bias in favor of persons as opposed to things; things 
may be rented, but persons may not be rented in a laborist system. The characteristic 
institution of so-called “capitalism” is not the private ownership of the means of produc-
tion but the voluntary contract for the renting of human beings, the employer–employee 
contract. (Ellerman 2007, 16)
Ellermanian “laborism” identifies wage labor, the vertical dimension, as the sole 
source of capitalist domination. This contradicts the anti-property thesis, which 
embraces both vertical and horizontal domination.
Ellerman’s cut is untenable. Consider the following two cases. Capitalist K 
hires worker L to work for eight hours per day. L’s wage, which allows her to 
subsist, is the monetary expression of four hours of work. K pockets the money 
equivalent of four hours per day as profit. Contrast a case in which L by working 
on her own well, but needs J’s bucket. L borrows the bucket from J. Under this 
arrangement, L works for eight hours per day. Her take-home pay is equivalent 
to four hours per day, while J pockets the rest as interest. That is, J pockets the 
money-equivalent of four hours per day of labor time, without doing an hour’s 
work.18 
Ellerman thinks that only K dominates L, because L rents herself out only to 
K, but not to J. Unlike Ellerman, I think each of K and J dominate L. Ellerman is 
right that L rents herself out to K for a wage. But if L rents herself out to K, then 
she also rents herself out to J, not for a wage, but for a bucket. That is, in both 
cases, L must produce for others just because those others own what L needs in 
order to subsist.19  There is, however, no reason that L should produce for K or J 
that is independent of K’s or J’s property-conferred power. That power allows 
both K and J to convert L’s labor into servitude. This is the “renting of human be-
ings,” succinctly summed up in the expression “domination of labour by capital.” 
So what could possibly ground Ellerman’s cut?
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Ellerman’s opposition to the possibility of horizontal domination has a re-
publican flavor, but it is couched in terms of inalienable rights. The idea is that the 
employment contract, unlike other market contracts, presupposes the fictio juris 
of property in the person. That is, to sell your labor power is to alienate rights to 
your own person and its powers. But these rights are inalienable: your labor power 
is yours by right, but not yours to sell by right. So labor markets—and the generic 
employment contract—are a form of wage slavery. As Carole Pateman puts it,
The justification of employment as the paradigm of free labor rests on the political fiction 
that one piece of property in the person, labor power, is alienable. In fact, labor power is 
not separable from its owner and so is not alienable.… [The fiction] distracts attention 
from the subordination that constitutes employment, and from what is actually alienated 
through the employment contract—the right of self-government. (Pateman 2002, 50)
Pateman and Ellerman believe that the sale of labor power is tantamount to the 
“alienation” of an (inalienable) right to self-government. Yet, for all that Pateman 
and Ellerman show, “alienating” an inalienable right is not necessary for the vi-
olation of that right. Suppose I have an inalienable (moral) right to exclusive use 
of this car. My (moral) right is violated when I sell my (legal) title to use it. That 
is not, however, the only way my (moral) right can be violated: you might, for 
example, steal it. By the same token, my right to self-government is not violated 
only when I sell my labor power to you. It can also be violated when I borrow 
from you, or simply when I trade with you, on dominating terms (see the Lazy 
Colonialist and Robinson–Friday examples, above). It follows that wage labor is 
not the only way capitalists can violate your right to self-government: there is 
such a thing as horizontal domination.
I conclude that Ellerman is only half-right in maintaining that “democracy 
is at war with the renting of human beings, not with private property” (Ellerman 
1993, 19). Ellerman’s premise is true: democracy is at war with the renting of 
human beings. But Ellerman’s inference is invalid; he signally and consequen-
tially fails to note the different ways in which the propertied can convert them-
selves into lessees and the propertyless into lessors of their own person, quite 
independently of the employment contract.
5. Egalitarians against Property
According to the political-egalitarian justification of workplace democracy, 
capitalists—owners of the means of production—tend to have a greater-than-
equal say in politics. This conclusion seems consistent with the anti-property the-
sis. A political-egalitarian workplace democrat (hereafter egalitarian ) may resist 
this conclusion, on the grounds that universal workplace democracy, together 
with healthy representative institutions, suffices to check the power of private 
property, thus ensuring political equality. I now show why this conclusion is false, 
on the egalitarian’s own terms. Private control over investment—that is, private 
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property in the means of production—can undermine an equal say, even when 
such control is universally vested in democratic, worker-managed cooperatives.
Przeworski (1985) argues that capitalists have power over governments, in 
part because they can credibly threaten to disinvest or relocate. Carrying out 
the threat precipitates job losses and wage cuts, undermining any government’s 
re-election prospects. Hence, insofar as governments are interested in re-election, 
capitalists have power over governments. Now suppose there is an economy of 
cooperatives, owned and controlled by their own workers. Perhaps the economy 
has the structure of Ellermanian market socialism, in which loans from prof-
it-seeking cooperative banks fund worker-controlled cooperatives (Vanek 1970; 
Ellerman 2007). The reason Ellermanian cooperatives are more conducive to 
political equality than capitalist firms is that they are unlikely to relocate in re-
sponse to democratically authorized tax hikes, or to lay off workers in response 
to minimum wage legislation, and so on. As emphasized in Section 2, these are 
the kinds of concerns animating egalitarians.
But now note that even Ellermanian cooperatives must, under a regime of 
private property, control their own investment, hiring, and pricing policy. There 
are, in general, two ways firms can affect electors and thereby leverage govern-
ments. They can cut worker incomes and they can increase unemployment.20  
There are, in turn, two ways to increase unemployment: firms can lay workers 
off, or—assuming a growing labor force—they can fail to hire. Suppose that 
Ellermanian cooperatives would be disinclined to fire their own members. They 
can still undermine democratic decisions by failing to hire new workers, or, less 
directly, by raising prices faster than nominal wages.
Now suppose there is a democratically authorized decision to raise the mini-
mum wage. Cooperatives can defeat this decision, à la Christiano (see p. 4 above), 
by threatening not to hire new workers.21  The threat is, in turn, made credible by 
their failure to invest. For under a regime of private control over investment, “the 
profits of enterprises today are the investments of tomorrow, and the investments 
of tomorrow are the employment of the day after” (Helmut Schmidt, cited in 
Przeworski 1985, 43). Private employment, in other words, presupposes private 
investment. It follows that the only way the nonhiring threat can be made non-
credible consists in wresting control over investment decisions from its private 
owners.
To summarize the argument so far: private ownership of capital, whether 
by cooperatives or by capitalist firms, can only be reproduced by maintaining 
the owner’s rate of profit. But maintaining profit sometimes requires higher un-
employment and/or lower real incomes. Suppose governments depend, for their 
re-election, on the overall level of unemployment, or of worker real incomes. 
Suppose, further, that private owners of capital—in this case, Ellermanian co-
operatives—control their own investment, hiring, and pricing policies, such that 
they sometimes optimize collectively by raising unemployment and/or lower-
ing worker real income. It follows that such cooperatives would sometimes be 
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disposed to wield power to the detriment of democratically authorized deci-
sions. Private ownership of capital, in other words, violates political equality. It 
follows that even Ellermanian cooperatives possess a Christiano-type greater-
than-equal say. This suffices to establish the anti-property thesis on egalitarian 
grounds.22 
The argument just rehearsed applies, with equal force, to an influential case 
for worker-control, due to Carol Gould. Gould (1988, 2014) arrives at a defense 
of worker control from a premise about “equal rights to the conditions of self-de-
velopment.” The idea is that, if all have equal claims to the conditions of agency, 
then “free agents have a right of self-determination or self-rule, which … implies 
an equal right of codetermination concerning all common activities in which they 
engage, whether political or economic” (Gould 1988, 143–44) Gould thinks this 
right entails “property rights … as well as management rights” in the firm. It also 
allows for market exchanges between firms, but would “generally exclude the 
market between capital and labour, since the wages would be determined in the 
process of self-management, by the workers’ own allocation among themselves 
of the net revenue of the firm” (Gould 1988, 145). Yet individual cooperatives 
can still defeat democratically authorized decisions, especially if they are work-
er-owned, through decentralized and uncoordinated optimizing decisions per-
taining to prices and employment. Gould suggests that these problems should be 
addressed through “planning and market-regulatory commissions” representing 
the “workers in general” (Gould 1988, 254–55). But then individual firms will 
not be allowed to dispose of their property rights as they see fit; investment deci-
sions will be severely circumscribed and effectively socialized. Gould therefore 
affirms a version of the anti-property thesis.
I conclude that the only democratic remedy to capitalist inequities consists 
in wresting (some) control rights over investment from its private owners. The 
socialism thesis does not, however, follow. One might, for example, nationalize 
the means of production and vest control over them in un elected state officials. 
This is roughly the stratagem devised by European social democracy during the 
Trente Glorieuses . Under the auspicious economic circumstances of postwar 
reconstruction, high-ranking union officials colluded with high-ranking politi-
cians and state officials to keep industrial democracy at bay (see Miliband 1972; 
Mandel 1974). In return, workers were provided with better welfare, wages, and 
work conditions. This stratagem reproduces the equal-say problem; it implies 
that state officials, not capitalists, abridge democratic equality. In other words, if 
one grants—with workplace democrats—that public ownership without worker 
control is undemocratic, then it follows that the social-democratic stratagem vio-
lates the equal-say requirement. This is why the democratic socialization of pro-
duction may be better served by an independently elected labor chamber , that 
is, a federation of workers’ councils, elected from individual workplaces, and 
endowed with control rights over aggregate investment.23  Unlike the social- 
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democratic stratagem, this institutional setup upholds economic democracy. I 
will return to it in Section 7.
6. The Keynesian Gambit
The defender of private property might now appeal to a Keynesian gambit . 
That is, she might appeal to a stabilization program that guarantees full employ-
ment through state management of aggregate demand in the economy, leaving 
private property untouched. If that program succeeds, republicans and political 
egalitarians can disembark the democratic train at workplace democracy, safe in 
the knowledge that Keynesian demand management will usher in full employ-
ment by stimulating private investment. Such a stimulus might operate through 
helicopter drops of money, money-financed tax cuts, or interest rate cuts.24  The 
Keynesian gambit, in other words, attempts to block the move from the structural 
dependence thesis, which it affirms, to the anti-property thesis, which it denies.
I now argue against the Keynesian gambit, by generalizing the argument of 
the previous sections. Consider an Ellermanian economy in which all firms are 
worker-owned and worker-controlled. There is a market for cooperative member-
ships, such that nonmembers of cooperatives can join cooperatives if, but only if, 
they pay the market-determined entrance fee. It can be shown that, under these 
conditions, the individual cooperative will hire workers up to the point that its 
marginal value product—the marginal product of labor in money—is equal to the 
wage offered in the external labor market.
Now suppose there is a democratically authorized decision to raise the min-
imum wage. Cooperatives can respond either by raising prices, or by reducing 
employment.25  If they opt for the former option, such that full employment is pre-
served, this will lead to inflation, which will eventually corrode the original dem-
ocratic decision by reducing workers’ real incomes.26  If, on the other hand, the 
cooperatives choose not to raise prices, or have no room to do so—because, say, 
prices in the economy are stable—then they optimize by reducing employment. 
This optimizing choice, again, indirectly defeats the original, democratically au-
thorized, decision to raise minimum wages, by creating an excess supply of labor.
Michael Kalecki lucidly summarizes this argument:
In the slump, either under the pressure of the masses, or even without it, public investment 
financed by borrowing will be undertaken to prevent large-scale unemployment. But if 
attempts are made to apply this method in order to maintain the high level of employ-
ment … strong opposition by business leaders is likely to be encountered … lasting full 
employment is not at all to their liking. The workers would “get out of hand” and the 
“captains of industry” would be anxious to “teach them a lesson.” … In this situation a 
powerful alliance is likely to be formed between big business and rentier interests.… The 
pressure of all these forces … would most probably induce the government to return to 
the orthodox policy of cutting down the budget deficit. (Kalecki 1943, 4–5)
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This section has argued that Kalecki’s admonitions apply even to an economy 
under universal worker control. It follows that democracy and private property 
are largely incompatible, even when private property is exclusively vested in dem-
ocratic firms. The anti-property thesis is safe.
7. Institutional Implications
I have argued that a commitment to workplace democracy—based on the 
republican or political-egalitarian normative principles sketched above—entails 
opposition to private property. This is the anti-property thesis. If, moreover, that 
opposition is to be resolved democratically, as republicans and political egalitar-
ians think it must, then some control rights over aggregate investment must be 
vested in democratic institutions. This is the socialism thesis. What kinds of 
institutions could fulfill this task? I conclude by sketching a response to this 
question.
John Rawls provides the two standard liberal answers to the institutional 
question: the first is “liberal socialism,” the second property-owning democracy 
(Rawls 2001, 136–38). Property-owning democracy is the idea that the concen-
tration of wealth can be attenuated through predistribution, that is, through pub-
licly funded health and education, progressive taxation of real estate and capital 
gains, demogrants, and possibly coupon ownership of the major means of produc-
tion (see O’Neill and Williamson 2012 for different accounts of property-owning 
democracy). Rawlsian liberal socialism, on the other hand, combines predistri-
bution with worker-managed firms. Neither answer will completely satisfy the 
workplace democrat, republican or egalitarian. Property-owning democracy con-
fers too much power on managers and owners of private capital (see Vrousalis 
2018a). Liberal socialism, for its part, is liable to confering too much power on 
state officials, such that those officials either dominate citizens (Thomas 2017, 
178–215), or abrogate their right to an equal say (see footnote 22 and the text ap-
pended to it). What workplace democrats need is an institutional setup that does 
not allow capitalists, managers, or state officials to dominate the direct producer 
or to abridge her right to an equal say. In a word, they need a theory of the social-
ist state. The rest of this section considers one such theory.
Consider the old model of worker control: workers own and manage their 
workplace conditions of production through democratically elected workplace 
councils. Each council elects representatives to a regional workers’ coun-
cil, which may also include consumers, experts, and other affected citizens. 
Regional councils elect national councils, which are, in turn, entrusted with 
control over aggregate investment in the economy.27  In this model, workplace 
councils are the building blocks of economy-wide councils, which exercise 
direct control over economy-wide conditions of production. The argument of 
this article has been that the desirability of states and (independently consti-
tuted) councils depends on whether they promote democracy and the values that 
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justify it—political-egalitarian, republican, and so on. Republican and egalitar-
ian workplace democrats agree that both unchecked state and capitalist power 
undermine these values. Now suppose there is a system of “dual power,” in 
which democratic parliaments and independently constituted workers’ councils 
share control over the means of production in the economy as a whole. Suppose 
that, as a result, the power of capitalist, manager, or bureaucrat does not hold 
sway; everyone gets an equal say. Then the envisaged transfer of power from 
state institutions to workers’ councils is not incongruent with democratic values. 
Indeed, it is required  by these values.
Unfortunately, this is not all. Most past attempts at the democratic social-
ization of investment through workers’ councils were disastrous failures. They 
include 1917 Russia, 1918 Germany, 1920 Italy, 1936 Spain, 1956 Hungary, 1973 
Argentina, 1974 Portugal, and so on. Some explanations for these failures have 
less to do with the workings of the council system itself and more with external 
circumstances, including bourgeois hostility, or war. Other explanations empha-
size the system itself. According to one such explanation, exclusive council con-
trol over the factories tends to lead to a full-fledged dictatorship of experts, as in 
the former political dictatorships of Eastern Europe.
It seems, then, that socialists are faced with a socialization dilemma . If con-
trol over the means of production is vested exclusively in state officials, or even 
in democratic parliaments, then the best we can hope for is a parliamentary sys-
tem served by an unaccountable and undemocratic state bureaucracy. If control 
over the means of production is vested exclusively in workers’ councils, on the 
other hand, then the likely outcome is a dictatorship of managers and experts 
(see Korsch 1975, 70–78; Poulantzas 2008, 366; Vrousalis 2018b). Socialists 
must therefore constantly wage a war on two fronts, quite independently of cap-
ital: against state officialdom, on the one hand, and against technocracy, on the 
other.28  By what institutional means might they wage that war? This is a difficult, 
even daunting, question, that has to do with the separation of powers between 
states, managers, and workers. It is a question that no one interested in economic 
democracy can ignore.
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Notes
1The article does not address parallel case arguments. Such arguments take political democracy as 
a premise and move from that premise to a conclusion about economic democracy (see Breen 
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2015; Landemore and Ferreras 2015 for defences of the parallel case, and Lopez-Guerra 2008 
for a critique). I do not take political democracy as a premise. Rather, I begin from certain justifi-
cations of democracy in general, and show that, if they support workplace democracy, then they 
support socialism.
2For a more extensive list drawn from the contemporary United States, see Anderson (2015, 63–64) 
and Gourevitch (2016, 315–18).
3In the context of the capitalist firm, principal–agent relationships arise because of the separation 
between ownership and control: owner nonworkers need nonowner workers to maximize share-
holder value, but lack full control over the policies and actions of the latter.
4Markets clear when and only when total demand for all goods equals available supply. A market 
might fail to clear because of rationing, price controls, and so on.
5I am here grateful to Christian Schemmel (private communication, 7/5/18). See Schemmel (2015) 
for relevant discussion.
6One of the reasons this article does not consider parallel-case arguments for workplace democracy is 
that they tend to assume (falsely) that states with private ownership of capital can be fully dem-
ocratic. Structural arguments, like Przeworski’s, call this assumption into question. See Cohen 
(1989, 29) for discussion.
7“Subordinate” is vague. Since my argument here is immanent to these theories, I only discuss repub-
lican and political-egalitarian interpretations of subordination.
8Such a commitment might, of course, be overridden by independent, stronger, considerations of, say, 
efficiency. But I doubt such considerations tell in favor of private property.
9Some republicans claim that dominating power and market competition are mutually exclusive (see 
Lovett 2010, 79; Taylor 2017, 29–65). This claim confuses market power with economic—that 
is, ownership-conferred—power. Perfect competition is perfectly compatible with dominating 
power (see Vrousalis 2013, 155).
10I assume that there is no agent heterogeneity, such that the absence of Tuesday toilet breaks does not 
harm any group of employees unequally.
11When a boss imposes penalties on Tuesday toilet breaks, she dominates her workers (see Section 1). 
But then so does Dictator.
12An anonymous referee points out that this would not, normally, be the case. The workers could 
democratically decide to keep the toilet breaks, but work harder, or cut prices, accepting a cut in 
their individual incomes. The point is moot. It suffices for my purposes that, according to repub-
licans, a Dictator who conditions the members of Friday Inc. in this fashion—subject to unjust 
background conditions—dominates them. And if it is granted that Robinson Inc. can similarly 
condition the members of Friday Inc., then republicans must censure private property, on grounds 
of domination. This section argues for the antecedent.
13Note that inequality in worldly resources is not a necessary condition for Robinson Inc. dominating 
Friday Inc. It might just be that the workers of Robinson Inc. are so much more knowledgeable, 
or talented, than the members of Friday Inc., that they can drive the latter out of business on a 
whim . If this power is arbitrary, on the republican account, then the former dominate the latter.
14It is not open to the republican to object that the constrained nature of Dictator’s choices make her 
any less of a dominator. To do so would be to exclude, by conceptual fiat, the very possibility of 
structural domination.
15See List and Pettit (2011, chap. 1) for an argument to this effect.
16It bears repeating that republicans need not be opposed to competitive power relations per se . The 
Friday Inc.–Robinson Inc. relation may be objectionable on grounds of domination only if it 
emerges from an objectionable (e.g., domination-induced) prior distribution in the means of pro-
duction.
17One can be opposed to pimping without being opposed to prostitution. The point of this section, 
however, is that republican workplace democrats can’t consistently be opposed to pimps—on the 
basis of the normative principles that constitute such opposition—but not to prostitution, in the 
relevant sense. Republican opposition to bosses, in other words, commits them to opposition to 
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private property.
18What enables this unequal labor flow? Republicans and political-egalitarians have not addressed the 
power-induced nature of labor flow in the context of capitalist markets. I shall assume, without 
argument, that the relationship between J and L resembles the Friday–Robinson case in involving 
exploitation, that is, power-induced unilateral labor flow. I defend this account of exploitation in 
“How Exploiters Dominate,” which is available from me upon request.
19That is, by making what consumers of L’s goods need (in this case, water). To be sure, L needs a 
bucket, and J’s bucket was made by someone; the bucket embodies human labor. But J has not, 
by assumption, done a day’s work: she either stole the bucket, or inherited it, or came to possess 
it through some fortuitous concatenation of events. If Lazy Colonialist dominates Friday, or if 
Robinson dominates Friday, then J dominates L.
20This conclusion depends on whether there is a market for memberships to cooperative firms. In the 
absence of such a market, individual cooperatives have an incentive to keep marginal revenue 
product relatively high, thereby rationing employment at suboptimally low levels (the classic 
study is Ward 1958). If, on the other hand, there is a membership market, then individual coop-
eratives will maximize total profit, just like the generic capitalist firm (see Dow 2003, chap. 7).
21How they do this will depend, in part, on whether there is a market for cooperative memberships (see 
previous footnote). If there is such a market, then the cooperative’s employment rate will con-
tract—members will sell their memberships—until marginal revenue product equals the external 
wage option. If there is no membership market, then employment may not contract in response 
to a wage hike, but will, in general, remain suboptimally low. In what follows I assume that there 
is a membership market.
22It will not do to object, in this context, that the optimizing decisions of individual democratic firms 
do not constitute credible threats because they are decentralized and uncoordinated. Suppose 
there is a democratically authorized decision to reduce the wages of public officials. High-rank-
ing officials with scarce talents threaten to quit in light of that decision. Their decentralized and 
uncoordinated threats, let us suppose, help overturn the decision. It follows that they thereby 
abrogate democratic equality. But then so do the decentralized and uncoordinated actions of 
optimizing capitalists.
23In Section 7, I sketch an argument that such assemblies should be constituted independently of the 
political state.
24I exclude demand-management through public ownership, which is not part of any Keynesian gam-
bit in favor of private property.
25More formally, let p , MP(L) , and w stand for the price of output, the marginal product of labor, and 
the wage rate, respectively. MP(L) is diminishing in L and w is exogenously given. The coop-
erative sets pMP(L) = w . It follows that, when w increases, the cooperative must either raise p 
or reduce L . Assuming the economy is originally at full employment, any general reduction in L 
results in unemployment and any increase in p  results in inflation.
26Profit retrieval through inflation was, in fact, the strategy adopted by European capitalists at the end 
of the postwar boom (see Rowthorn 1980).
27David Schweickart (2011) develops an elegant model of investment planning along similar lines. 
However, he does not offer a theory of the state. The theory of the state is the Achilles heel of 
many of these theories: I discuss this in Vrousalis (2018b).
28See Gould (1988) for discussion of the technocracy horn of the socialization dilemma.
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